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This article retraces progression of Engelhardt’s work so as to place After 
God in broader context. In The Foundations of Bioethics, Engelhardt 
argues that given the moral pluralism that is at the core of postmoder-
nity, only a merely formal morality of permission can bind moral stran-
gers in peaceful coexistence. In The Foundations of Christian Bioethics, 
Engelhardt presents a bioethics that binds Orthodox Christian moral 
friends. After God shows itself more pessimistic about the possibility of a 
merely formal morality of moral friends and calls traditional Christians 
to wage a culture war. These reflections close with some criticisms of 
Engelhardt’s philosophical-theological project.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In stark contrast with much of the tedium of current specialist academic 
debates on bioethics, H. T. Engelhardt Jr.’s latest book After God is a refresh-
ing experience. Engelhardt’s philosophical approach fleshes out issues often 
reduced exclusively to mere legal and political facets. Engelhardt is one 
of the founders of bioethics, which he considers to be a specific form that 
moral philosophy takes in our present day societies, rather than as a free-
standing discipline. Bioethics calls us to rethink the meaning of universal 
human experiences—such as birth, death and illness—in light of the dilem-
mas which medicine and emergent technologies raise.1 Engelhardt’s thought 
is an actual “ethics of life,” the meaning of which affects the entirety of moral 
philosophy, its history and fate, as well as its relationship with metaphysics 
and theology.
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After God is a paradoxical and provocative book. It is ambitious, com-
parable to the work of Leo Strauss (1953) or Alasdair MacIntyre (2007): it 
aims to rethink the role of ethics within the framework of non-religious, 
post-Enlightenment modernity. The publication of the book gives us a good 
opportunity to retrace the progression of the Engelhardt’s work.
II. MORAL FRIENDS, MORAL STRANGERS, AND THE ETHICS OF 
PERMISSION
H. T. Engelhardt Jr. is known to a wide readership through his most influential 
work, The Foundations of Bioethics, published in two editions (Engelhardt, 
1986, 1996). The book follows a skeptical assessment of the capacity of rea-
son: philosophy is unable to provide a rational demonstration of the ultimate 
goals and the founding principles of human life and civil cohabitation, and 
of supplying an adequate justification of their hierarchy. Contemporary soci-
eties consist of persons who have very diverse and complex notions of what 
“good” is. In virtue of these diverse notions, they are, in Engelhardt’s terms, 
“moral strangers” to each other. In such a context, ethical theories cannot 
be both universal and content-full. According to Engelhardt, the categories 
developed by contemporary moral philosophy are not justified, and above 
all they are not justifiable. In the best case, such moral philosophies cannot 
hold true to their promise; in the worst case, they are misleading insofar as 
they claim universality for what is merely socially-historically conditioned. 
Substantial or content-full ethical theories unquestionably do exist, but they 
cannot be universal. On the other hand, an ethical theory can be universal, 
but only insofar as it remains merely formal, because any content-full moral-
ity requires a perspective which eludes rational justification.
In contrast to moral strangers, moral friends share first principles and a 
conception of the end or goal of human existence. These, in Engelhardt’s 
view, are not won through reason or the strength of persuasion, but by shar-
ing a content-full or substantial ethos. These moral friends do not purport to 
use reason to justify principles and goals, simply because they do not need 
to; although they do not exclude rationality as a means to describe their cen-
tral principles and goals, they are unable rationally to justify the goodness of 
such principle and goals.
Although Engelhardt’s account and arguments are certainly original, they 
do resemble Nietzsche’s and Weber’s diagnosis of a polytheism of values. 
Values can of course be analyzed rationally, but whether or not any given 
person adheres to any particular set of values has nothing to do with rea-
son. It refers to extra-rational considerations, such as love, faith, or tradi-
tion. Pluralism is unsurpassable, or at least cannot be surpassed through 
the mere force of reason, claims Engelhardt. There are four means, in his 
view, to overcome controversies: (1) using force, (2) appealing to conver-
sion, (3) persuasion by means of a correct rational argument, and lastly (4) 
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agreement. Once conversion and persuasion have been discarded as imprac-
tical or ineffective, the only solution to avoid the use of force is to establish 
purely formal moral criteria based on universally accepted procedures. Such 
procedures are necessarily limited in their effectiveness: the only principle 
that individuals belonging to very diverse moral communities may wish to 
respect is not to use other people without their permission.
Engelhardt’s choice of the term “permission” is deliberate. Permission 
should be contrasted with autonomy—one of the main tenets of secular bio-
ethics, as seen, for example, in the work of Beauchamp and Childress (2013), 
or in certain types of political liberalism. Unlike autonomy, permission, in 
Engelhardt’s view, does not represent an independent value or an ultimate 
goal of human existence. Rather, permission is a mere “side constraint”: it is 
a necessary condition in which to ground cooperation rather than conflict 
among individuals. This is why Engelhardt cannot be listed among the cham-
pions of pluralism: he merely acknowledges its primacy (see Engelhardt, 
2011, 400). Given that we lack universal, content-full principles, permission 
is seen as the origin of moral authority. Engelhardt’s focus, then, is on the 
use of permission in solving conflicts without the use of force; permission 
for him is not the ultimate truth of a secular, liberal morality. If one wishes 
to avoid conflict, we have to keep within the boundaries of a minimum 
agreement among individuals. In addition, it has yet to be proved that the 
principle of autonomy should prevail over considerations of beneficence or 
justice (cf. Engelhardt, 2011, 405).
From this angle, the public square is seen as a place where individuals 
from a range of perspectives meet as moral strangers. The libertarian nature 
of Engelhardt’s ethics does not stem from seeing permission as an essential 
aspect of individual autonomy. Permission must be understood not as a con-
tent-full principle but, one might say, as a precautionary choice: Permission is 
merely the lesser of two evils when compared to conflict. In fact, the formal 
and libertarian morality of The Foundations of Bioethics is wholly compatible 
with lives within communities of moral friends, which are not always liber-
tarian and always content-full. If, on the contrary, permission were seen as 
akin to autonomy—as a normative and content-full principle—it would have 
to be applied even within communities of moral friends. In many cases, it 
would end by clashing with communitarian values, if and when they proved 
incompatible with the idea of individual self-fulfillment at the core of secular 
accounts of autonomy.
III. A CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS
But, such a position is easily misunderstood, perhaps because it is out-
dated. For example, Engelhardt has been at times presented as a theorist of 
a libertarian and secular ethic and a defender of a “strong” secular idea of 
morality (see Engelhardt, 2011, 10). In fact, Engelhardt’s perspective can be 
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fully understood only when one takes into account his later work, starting 
with The Foundations of Christian Bioethics (Engelhardt, 2000). The book 
affirms its Christian perspective right from the title. Yet, the understand-
ing of “Christian” is quite radical, and is informed by the author’s choice to 
leave the Roman Catholic Church for Orthodox Christianity in 1991. Given 
Engelhardt’s decision to articulate a bioethics from a content-full Christian 
ethics, the path outlined in Foundations of Bioethics becomes even more 
apparent in After God. The former intends to describe the actual conditions 
for a minimal universal ethics in a post-Christian or neo-Pagan society. In the 
latter, the fundamental issue seems to be how to establish conditions for a 
content-full Christian ethic to be possible in a society after God. Although it 
cannot be described as a shift, because both the main theoretical tools and 
the solutions proposed are basically the same, there is a different background 
hue, which corresponds to the different angle Engelhardt employs to look at 
the same phenomena. His perspective is no longer that of “moral strangers.” 
Rather, he develops at length the perspective of “moral friends,” specifically, 
the minority view of Orthodox or traditional Christian moral friends.
The dialectic in After God develops along three guiding lines:
(1) gaining a better understanding of the historical, philosophical, and cul-
tural roots of the present day crisis where the opposition is not just to 
secular ethics, but to secularized Christian theology, be it Roman Catholic 
or Protestant;
(2) a critical rethinking of types of life in present day societies as well as of 
secular ethics itself; secular ethics is perceived not just as a false form of 
universalism—the result of a specific community presuming to develop a 
universal ethical-political proposal—but as the demoralization and defla-
tion of morality, in other words, a non-morality or amorality;
(3) attempting to deal with the fact that the minimal, universal, and purely 
formal ethics that had been outlined in Foundations cannot be put into 
practice.
The awareness of the project’s failure leads Engelhardt to state the need for 
a real culture war, seen as an extreme form of resistance against the advance 
of an immanentist modernity.
IV. SECULARIZATION: ATHENS AND JERUSALEM
As for the first point, let us see what Engelhardt means when he maintains 
that our secular society is post-Christian. Modern society is “after God” in that 
it has definitively decreed the death of God and the purity of Christian cat-
egories is radically questioned by society’s culture.2 According to Engelhardt, 
secularization cannot be interpreted, as some hold, as the actual implemen-
tation or genuine fruition of Christian truths. Rather, he claims, it is quite 
the opposite: it is the total loss of the original meaning of the Christian 
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experience; secularization means that Christianity has been defeated and 
has dissolved into the secular culture. Secular humanism is doomed to fail 
precisely because it is unable to reconcile the content-fullness and universal-
ity which seemed to ensure the existence of Christian thought in a Christian 
society.
Christian ethics, endeavouring to come to terms with modernity, also has 
its own issues. Progressively, Engelhardt’s focus has shifted from the more 
proactive approach of The Foundations of Bioethics to the mainly diagnostic 
approach of his later works, where the crisis of the modern world is retraced 
and the issues it raises for Christian ethics are addressed. Over the centu-
ries, Christian theology has dealt with the paradoxes raised in the famous 
dilemma in Plato’s Euthyphro: is what is in and of itself right and pious loved 
by the gods or it is right and pious because it is loved by the gods? In the 
former, the goodness of God’s commandment is justified by its rationality 
and in the latter the justification of the moral norm is based on the com-
mandment of God. This question is central to a proper understanding of 
theology. According to Engelhardt, the history of Western Christian theology 
is a virtually uninterrupted process aimed at avoiding the theocentric horn of 
the dilemma and the particular results which it entails.
However, opting for this rationalist approach has also led to major if not 
worse consequences: progressively, Christian ethics lost its identity and its 
ability to distinguish itself from secular ethics, as shown by the results of 
the twentieth-century Christian bioethics. When Christian bioethics sought 
legitimacy on the basis of its practical effectiveness, Christianity was reduced 
to a cultural or aesthetic phenomenon. It took on the guise of a vague cos-
mopolitan social gospel. A clear example of this is Karl Rahner’s theory of 
the “anonymous Christian.” According to Engelhardt, it owes its origin to 
the difficulty of accepting the paradoxical effects of the theocentric horn of 
Euthyphro’s dilemma, concerning the contingency and the historical nature 
of the Christian Revelation. One should also consider that whole eras of 
history, parts of the globe, billions of good people, great philosophers and 
virtuous artists will die forever, whereas those who believe in Jesus Christ 
and His Resurrection will enjoy eternal life. The theory of the anonymous 
Christian is basically an adjustment of the religious rationalist theories of the 
seventeenth century and the Enlightenment; it is a way to include non-Chris-
tians in the salvific event. Anyone able to adopt the guiding lines of secular 
morality, on this view, in fact reconfirms the core of Western Christianity, 
even if unconsciously. This move occurs thanks to the capacity every human 
being has of perceiving grace as a result of natural reason. Yet, in such cases 
the affirmation of the core of Western Christianity cannot be made explicit 
and fully achieved, as that is only possible through faith. The paradoxical 
results of this line of thought—which hides a Pagan conceptual core—high-
light the need to disentangle the close bond between Western Christianity 
and philosophical reason.
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Engelhardt thus joins a debate about the de-Hellenization of Christianity 
which started in the first decades of the past century and continued until 
recently and does so in a provocative and paradoxical manner.3 From his 
standpoint, the definition of secular culture is very precise: philosophy, and 
specifically Greek philosophy. Using Leo Strauss’s apt metaphor, surrender 
took place when Christianity chose Athens and repudiated Jerusalem. The 
Christianity of the Fathers of the Church did not place any special trust in 
philosophy and in the ability of reason to establish a canonical morality. For 
the Fathers, morality was based on the idea of a transcendental God. In After 
God, the author sees Jewish and Christian moral norms as not being based 
on reason but on God’s commands; this is one of Engelhardt’s fundamental 
theses. Theology is not seen as a philosophical discipline, but as implying a 
personal encounter with the Living God.
Engelhardt describes a complex historical development, but inside each 
of these lines decisive historical-political changes are discussed. First and 
foremost, Engelhardt addresses Augustine of Hippo. The new vision of the 
relationship between Christianity and philosophy starts to emerge with the 
first of the Latin Fathers of the Church who wrote great philosophical-theo-
logical works. Augustine’s works inaugurate a new idea of theology seen as 
a rational discipline which sets the foundations for the subsequent rupture 
with Eastern Christianity. Augustine is the turning point which precedes the 
later developments in Western Christian theology that attribute primacy to 
reason for the discovery of natural truths—or at least attribute reason to their 
core, a core which, on this view, coincides with the truths of faith. Before 
that time, Christianity had made great use of a Greek approach without 
betraying Jerusalem, that is, without rethinking its theological and moral 
principles within the philosophical framework first developed in Athens.
Both in its Roman Catholic and in its Protestant versions, Western 
Christianity preferred to avoid sectarianism in favor of universality. As for 
Roman Catholicism, Engelhardt’s thesis is that the break with the Church of 
the first millennium and the birth of Scholasticism were a major turning point. 
In the pre-Scholastic era, the Church’s pastoral theological spirit was much 
closer to what it had been in the first millennium, where Christianity was 
proposed as fideism and mystic experience. The hallmark of the Scholastic 
period was a greater concern for a rational rethinking and systematization 
of concepts. Roman Catholicism has a historically determined origin, which 
has left Western culture with a false idea of the relationship between faith 
and reason. It raises the expectation that it will successfully develop an 
ethical-philosophical vision able to overcome moral pluralism. In spite of all 
the breaks and radicalizations in a very complex tradition, first millennium 
and present day Roman Catholicism share the faith in human reason which 
leads to the claim of a faith founded in rationality, as well as in the doctrine 
of natural law. Hence, the basic continuity between Scholasticism and the 
Enlightenment springs from this commonly held faith in human reason.
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Engelhardt’s paradoxical thesis is that Catholicism is at the origin and 
underlies the process of secularization that led to moral pluralism: in other 
words, it is not in direct opposition to modernity, as many would believe, 
but, in fact, it is the first major concession to modernity. Things are not very 
different where Protestants are concerned: with the Reformation, which is 
another radical break within the Christian tradition, the person and the Bible 
are interpreted outside of both the community and the tradition. On the one 
hand, the Reformation is an attempt to produce a new beginning and to go 
back to the purity of origins, letting go of corruptions brought with time; it 
appeals to constraint-free analysis, to the role of individuals who no longer 
have to mediate their contact with God. Thus, Protestantism destroys the 
historical and communitarian bond thinking outside and above the com-
munity. Although sixteenth and seventeenth century Protestant communities 
developed a wealth of content-full morality, the formal principle that they 
posited “undermined the contents of said morality and the cohesion of their 
communities” (Engelhardt, 2011, 107, translations mine). Since Kant, liberal 
Protestantism, in order to avoid the accusation of being sectarian, has tried to 
produce a secular, moral and philosophical vision able to speak to all human 
beings. Clearly, this heralds the later alliance of Protestant and secular ethics, 
both focused on the protection of persons and their autonomy, and aimed at 
achieving social justice.
Engelhardt sees Orthodoxy as the point of view which makes it possible 
for us to gain a better understanding of the crisis of the West, along two 
main lines: the first which dates back to fifth century B.C. Greece—the birth 
of philosophy—and the second which started when Western Christianity 
underwent a process of Hellenization, appearing as a philosophy. Medieval 
Christian theology acted as the transmission chain of Greek rationality, its 
unattainable aims, its failures, carrying those ideas to the modern world. In 
other words, there is a link between such claims (founding a content-full 
policy and ethics on reason), their failure (rationality is either purely formal 
or plural), and the emergence of an after-God (atheist) culture: once its 
handmaid, theology has now become the mistress of reason. The specificity 
of Christian moral constraints—the experience of a personal God who calls 
individuals to salvation at a given moment in time and space—is thus lost. 
Nowadays, it is theology that has to seek legitimacy in rational forms. We 
should thank scholastic theology, if philosophy has become the judge that 
can decide what comes under moral constraints and what does not.
In contrast, Engelhardt affirms a distinct view of Christian moral constraints 
as coming from noetic experience of God; thus, mere moral philosophy can-
not be real moral theology, and Christian theology cannot be a mere moral 
philosophy. It is in this general framework that Engelhardt places the brief 
blossoming and equally rapid decline of Christian bioethics. Now anachro-
nistic sectarianism and a quest for universalism tear Christian bioethics apart 
and water down its specificity. Sectarianism means that Christian ethics do 
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not apply to all human beings, but are part of a special narrative marked 
by milestones such as creation, sin, the Incarnation, redemption and salva-
tion. With the help of concepts from Thomas Kuhn, Engelhardt describes 
the existence of a Roman Catholic paradigm in medical ethics. For centuries, 
such a paradigm was able to structure a single and consistent research com-
munity where controversies could arise, within which there was a method to 
solve said controversies, and an authority to whom one could appeal in the 
case of conflict (Engelhardt, 2000, 8). This is a universalist paradigm in that 
it purports that it can speak to any human being, regardless of the person’s 
accepting or refusing Christian grace and Revelation. Thus, moral duties stem 
from a natural law which binds all human beings, regardless of their choice 
of faith. Hence, we see the paradox concerning technology from which cur-
rent Roman Catholic thinking suffers: it puts forward a thesis that everyone 
considers to refer to a specific group, but which Roman Catholic bioethics 
consider universal and an expression of natural reason (Engelhardt, 2011, 
109). The aforementioned paradigm underwent further radicalization during 
the Second Vatican Council which, according to Engelhardt, led to a rethink-
ing of the tenets of Christian ethics. Rethinking was not limited to Roman 
Catholicism, but soon spread to the other Western Christian denominations, 
further strengthening the universal value of the Roman Catholic ethics.
Following these developments, Christian bioethics found itself unable to 
uphold its own identity and ended, becoming part of secular bioethics. There 
seem to be two main reasons leading to its disintegration:
(1) internal pluralism within Christian thinking, which was not perceived 
as a wealth of opinions but as a sign of frailty and conceptual confu-
sion. This newer pluralism, in Engelhardt’s view, is first and foremost 
the result of the schism from the Eastern Church, then of breaking with 
the Reformed Western Christianity, and lastly of the Second Vatican 
Council’s rethinking of the Roman Catholic Church. Paradoxically, the 
Council created a new interdenominational division, between traditional 
and post-traditional Christians, a division which currently is present in all 
Churches. Faced with the challenge of secular humanism and its bioeth-
ics, this divided and uncertain Christianity inevitably succumbed;
(2) the absence of clear theological foundations: because the highest truth 
of Christian bioethics was not grounded in a special Christian revela-
tion, it was unable to establish itself as a consistent and constructive 
structure. Christian bioethics became useless because secular bioethics 
proved more effective.
V. NEO-PAGANISM
This conclusion leads us to the second set of core issues in After God, 
which concerns the relationship between modernity and post-modernity. 
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In The Foundations of Bioethics, and again in The Foundations of Christian 
Bioethics, Engelhardt defined the contemporary era and society as neo-Pagan. 
Unlike ancient Pagan faiths, the feature of neo-Paganism is that it comes after 
Christianity. This means that neo-Paganism has to come to terms with the 
same expectations that Christian culture had to come to terms with, that of 
universal moral justification. Further, neo-Paganism has to rely uniquely in 
fragments of moral intuitions, which come to us from a whole and once 
intact life form, that cannot be conceptualized within one single concep-
tual framework.4 However, strictly speaking a neo-Pagan society does not 
purport to be a completely godless society: it is a polytheist society which 
does without the Christian God or places it alongside other divinities, a God 
among Gods, thus denying the Christian God’s existence in the light of mon-
otheism. Both Paganism, which is unquestionably a form of religious experi-
ence, as well as some of the traditional forms of Enlightenment atheism that 
obsessively try to demonstrate the nonexistence of God appear to betray a 
form of naive nostalgia. There is a certain nostalgia for a metaphysical prin-
ciple—even if not for the Christian God—which makes them still appear as 
a pseudo-religious form of thought. The same is not true for present day 
atheism, which appears to uphold a radical indifference toward any religious 
fact and displays a similarly radical dismissal of any form of transcendence.
Life is now unfolding in a society after God, which means dealing with the 
latter’s atheism. Modernity implies a critique and renouncing of Christianity. 
Postmodern societies imply renouncing God and in general any notion of 
transcendence. Enlightenment modernity is Pagan and deistic but not atheist. 
Postmodernity embraces a kind of atheism which has completely separated 
from transcendence and has happily embraced the closure of immanence. 
Engelhardt sees this as the difference between Kant and Hegel: Kant is one 
of the last modern philosophers to defend a perspective drawing from the 
past. Kant tries to found a traditional Christian morality without God. Hegel 
is defined as the first of the postmoderns: he was a Lutheran, with an imma-
nent, philosophical God, which has resulted in the emergence of a merely 
historical, socially-historically conditioned ethics. According to this interpre-
tation, there is no great distance between Hegel diagnosing post-modernity 
and post-modernity itself, as seen in thinkers such as Rorty to Vattimo. Post-
modernity sees a pluralism of theories all floating in the finite, historically 
contingent, and asserting themselves. This kind of pluralism leads to a demor-
alization and deflation of morality which is reduced to nothing more than a 
choice among lifestyles, a purely aesthetic and cultural fact, left to the taste 
and preferences of individuals lacking an actual root in a content-full ethos.
A further subtle, but significant, development on this issue can be observed 
with reference to the theses of The Foundations of Bioethics. In claiming uni-
versality for itself, secular ethics is actually not more universal than the ethics 
of traditional Christianity, be they Orthodox, Evangelical Protestants, or any 
other of the religious denominations not compromised by modernity, such as 
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Orthodox Jews or Muslims. There are several communities of moral friends 
all sharing content-full, but not universal, ethical perspectives. Secular athe-
ists are one of such communities, insofar as they offer a special interpreta-
tion of the principle of autonomy (and therefore of individualism) as a value 
and the ultimate goal of our existence. Conflict can be avoided if one aban-
dons the expectation of universally imposing the principle around which a 
special form of life is organized. An agreement has to be reached whereby 
permission, that is to say a notion of limited autonomy as a pure and simple 
source of authority, is free of any content. However, progressively, a change 
of perspective took place. In After God, secular morality is not seen as espe-
cially dangerous because it is thought to be universal. Strictly speaking, it 
is no longer a morality in that the demoralization and deflation of morality 
deprives it of any meaning. Postmodern atheists are not a community of 
moral friends, since they reduce a now groundless ethical choice to a mere 
choice among alternative lifestyles. Thus, they deprive society of the serious-
ness and rigor required to classify it as a morality. Engelhardt proves that 
there are many forms of moral rationality and that it is impossible by argu-
ment to reduce this pluralism to a unity, because there is no argument able 
to prove that one type of life is better than any other. In fact, it is undeniable 
that even in a secular society there can be many ways of creating equally 
respectable hierarchies of the good, and that the lives individuals and com-
munities choose can at times be loaded with values and ideals, tending 
towards good and a sense of responsibility. However, when one believes 
that life lacks an ultimate objective meaning, and that it all comes down to 
people using their own individual autonomy, when every meaning is socially 
and historically determined, it then becomes impossible to prove that it is 
irrational to embrace a vision which privileges either one’s personal, familial 
or one’s friends’ interest over another.
This conclusion leads us to the third line to which we referred previously. 
This view has a strongly pessimistic view as to the possibility of a minimal 
universal and purely formal ethics, explained clearly in The Foundations of 
Bioethics. The nature of this pessimism strongly sways Engelhardt towards 
radical conservatism: the minimal state does not exist in any part of the world 
and probably never has. It is quite the opposite: the development of post-
modern societies has increased the need for its being actualized more than in 
the past. Nowadays, Christianity must defend itself from being delegitimized 
by a secular culture which rejects any discourse outside of overtly rational 
and radically immanent forms. Furthermore, as Engelhardt acknowledges, 
these postmodern “secular fundamentalist states” do not merely recognize 
autonomy as the source of authority alongside moral communities: they 
view autonomy as a value and carry out a battle for the reform or the aboli-
tion of many content-full ethical views with which groups of moral friends 
have identified. Thus, After God goes beyond the constructive proposal in 
The Foundations of Bioethics and calls for active resistance, indeed, a real 
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cultural war which should add to—or better yet—even replace the secular 
state. When the authority of the state turns into the naked power of force 
and when the obligations to the state conflict with the organizing principles 
of one’s life, a mediation is no longer possible, and resistance is preferable.5
VI. CONCLUSION
At this point, it may be possible to draw some conclusions about Engelhardt’s 
thought. The most interesting facet is the critical aspect which highlights the 
difficulties and paradoxes of post-Enlightenment culture, which has proved 
unable to communicate with and to everyone, believers and nonbelievers. 
Although it is possibly a little uncharitable to brush him off as a mere attempt 
to re-theologize ethics (cf. Müller, 1995, 152), his thinking is only addressed to 
the members of a traditional religious denomination. If and when Engelhardt 
addresses his ideas to nonbelievers, it is only to call for their conversion or 
to fight a cultural battle. Ever since his early works, Engelhardt had started 
from a very peculiar idea of pluralism. Pluralism is not to be seen as the soul 
and vocation of modernity, where individualism and freedom are milestone 
achievements in the philosophy of history, but quite the opposite, as a mere 
alternative to conflict. Peaceful coexistence is not an inherent value, but sim-
ply the lesser of evils for moral subjects, who believe their goals to be valid, 
but who have abandoned the idea of imposing them as such equally across 
the entire public sphere. Moral friends choose pluralism simply in order to 
avoid a struggle of everyone against everyone, which would make it impos-
sible for them to cultivate and uphold their own values within special com-
munities of moral friends. This somewhat disenchanted realism is certainly 
one of the reasons why Engelhardt has taken on increasingly antimodern 
positions. The relationship between universal and formal morality (which 
is the hallmark of moral strangers), and particular and content-full moral-
ity which binds moral friends (e.g., specific faith communities), had been 
left unsolved in The Foundations of Bioethics. It had been left unclear if 
traditional religiosity’s acceptance of minimal libertarian ethics was a purely 
strategic choice or whether it was rooted in the ethos of its faith community. 
In other words, it was not clear why a community, which failed to adopt 
a vaguely Hobbesian, and in any case, modern sensitivity whereby safety 
is the greatest good, should wish to resolve controversies peacefully. The 
notion of a culture war clarifies beyond doubt how, when one uses a non-
universalist ethical perspective, the choice to avoid conflict is a purely stra-
tegic option. In the present day world, a secular, liberal, and cosmopolitan 
society where traditionalist Christians are a minority, these moral friends 
are depicted as fundamentalists and intolerant. The temptation is to answer 
ethical controversies with violence, making a vocation to martyrdom a pos-
sibility (Engelhardt, 2000, 198), possibly even a necessity. However, if power 
relations were to change, it might no longer appear to be so. By definition, 
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this very particularistic vision does not address itself to everyone, be they 
believers or nonbelievers, and does not appear to go beyond the proposal of 
an ethics of resistance, a resistance against secular modernity and an imma-
nentist attitude. This is why, faced with the bewilderment of our day and 
age, the only possibility to found a Christian ethic is a return to the origins, 
to the Christianity of the first millennium, starting with the acknowledgement 
of a transcendent God and the duties or obligations this entails. A basically 
mystic form of Christianity, which is founded in noetic theology, in ascetic 
experience and divine Enlightenment, is the keystone of Christian bioethics.
The perspective Engelhardt takes is rooted in the orthodox theological 
tradition, which enables him to hone in on a key problem for contemporary 
Christian ethics: the ongoing vacillation between the aspiration to have a par-
ticular, content-full (but potentially conflicting) view and the attempt to walk 
the path of universality (but risking the loss of one’s content). This approach 
highlights the risks of a Christian moral philosophy trying to deal with plural-
ism and secular ethics: the risk of losing one’s distinctive point of view and so 
fail to differentiate oneself from secular ethics. This approach seems to lead 
to a historical and conceptual leveling, which in turn means Engelhardt is 
overhasty in judging aspects of Western theology that must be more carefully 
understood and delineated with more precision. First, Engelhardt’s approach 
stipulates not just a comparability but almost an equivalence between Roman 
Catholic and Protestant bioethics, since they are considered only from a formal 
point of view. Yet, their contents and results have differed greatly. Secondly, 
the purported equivalence between Christian and secular bioethics is just 
as problematic.6 In particular, Engelhardt fails to recognize those traditions 
within the Protestant denominations (e.g., Barths’ dialectical theology, which 
greatly influenced twentieth century theology, and not just among Protestants; 
see Savarino, 2012, 48–61) and within the Roman Catholicism (e.g., personal-
ism) which reject the extremisms of liberal Christianity. Western Christianity is 
far from being a monolith. Even the process of de-Hellenization can be con-
ceived in two different and mutually exclusive ways. It can be seen as return-
ing to what there was before “Greek-ness” was introduced into the furrow of 
Christianity. However, it can also be seen as taking a new direction, retriev-
ing the meaning of original Christianity without forgetting to face modernity. 
Ockham, whom Engelhardt mentions, is a case in point and a precursor of 
the young Luther. From the vantage point of Engelhardt’s Christianity of the 
first millennium, it might be irrelevant to notice that Protestant theology in 
the early twentieth century also tried to follow in the footsteps of the young 
Luther, the path of a Christianity free of Greek influence. The attempt was 
to rediscover the meaning of a faith that fully recognizes the transcendence 
of God and His personal commands and that rejects the idea of a rationalist 
natural law. This Christianity did not identify theology with moral philoso-
phy and faith with mere precepts or guides for action. That notwithstanding, 
such a modern Christianity still attempts to address the issue of the historical 
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nature of faith. In other words, it does not forget to address questions like 
the following. Where does the will of God present itself? How can His com-
mandments be interpreted? Modern Christianity also considers the evolution 
of moral norms without slipping into biblical literalism or making a specific 
moral tradition a universal, absolute one.
Engelhardt seems to be constantly following a quest for a God who can 
guarantee peace and security as the foundation which can unify morality 
both in both its principles and practical results. However, that means he fails 
to conceive of Christian faith as a calling for individual responsibility. At the 
same time, Engelhardt remains outside any particular idea of reasonableness 
whereby human freedom is based on the impossibility of having knowledge 
of the Absolute. Thus, he is unable to move beyond indifference towards any 
revision of traditional doctrines. Deaf to any appeal to historicize Christianity 
itself, he appears unable to consider pluralism inside the Christian world as 
a wealth for many rather than a synonym of mental confusion.
NOTES
 1. Developing a thesis by Stephen Toulmin, Stanley Hauerwas (1986) accounts for the great interest 
Christian ethics displayed for medical ethics in the late twentieth century.
 2. An understanding of secularization can be classified, first, according to how continuity or lack 
of continuity between the secular era and the preceding time are organized, and second, by how the 
continuity or discontinuity is valued. Secularization can be interpreted either as the actual implementation 
of the Christian truths, or as the surrender and living of Christianity faced with modernity. For an introduc-
tion to these debates see Blumenberg (1985), Böckenförde (1991), Vattimo (1991), Taylor (2007), Berger, 
Davie, and Fokas (2008), Joas (2008), and Beck (2010).
 3. The issue of the Hellenization of Christianity was the focus of Pope Benedict XVI’s (2006) 
Regensburg’s lecture. A philosophically important reading is offered by the young Heidegger who, in the 
years preceding Being and Time, interpreted the de-Hellenization of Christianity from its origins re-reading 
authors such as Troeltsch and Harnack. The traditional ontological critique and of the Thomistic interpreta-
tion of Aristotle was functional in developing a hermeneutical ontology which was to peak in Being and 
Time and in Heidegger’s later works (Savarino, 2001). Engelhardt, on the other hand, offers a more radical 
criticism of the bond between Christianity and Hellenism: it leaves no room for mediation and aims at 
discarding any link between faith and reason, in the name of a sceptical criticism of the power of reason.
 4. The idea that contemporary ethics face the scenario of unresolved and apparently irresolvable 
controversies because it has to deal with fragments of moral intuitions lacking the context which informed 
their meaning is discussed in MacIntyre (2007).
 5. See Engelhardt (After God, 193): “A modus vivendi as I use it recognizes that many who acqui-
esce in the government as it is are merely biding their time until an opportunity exists for a regime 
change, perhaps even if this requires civil war.”
 6. The distinction between secular and Christian ethics cannot be exclusively conceived on a plane 
of metaphysical principles. Nor can it exclusively deal with the solution to moral and political problems. 
It refers to the manner in which such issues are understood and ultimately to the need to appeal to 
adequate frameworks of meaning. In fact, in some of his writing in the early 1990s, Engelhardt seemed 
to suggest a radical redefinition of the tasks of Christian ethics, moving towards a “theology which draws 
from all communities while not belonging to any” (Engelhardt, 2011, 63). He thus conceived that theology 
informed by authors such as John Findlay and Charles Hartshorne could teach secular bioethics what it 
cannot offer by definition because it deals exclusively with formal thinking: a rethinking of the meaning 
of life, suffering and death. Clearly this is not the approach Engelhardt chose in later years, when he 
embraced traditional Christianity.
181
Luca Savarino
REFERENCES
Beauchamp, T. L. and J. F. Childress. 2013. Principles of Biomedical Ethics.  7th ed. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Beck, U. 2010. A God of One’s Own: Religion’s Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence. 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Benedict XVI, Pope. 2006, Sept. 12. Faith, reason and the university: Memories and reflections. 
The Holy See [On-line]. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/
september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html 
(accessed March 23, 2017).
Berger, P. G. Davie and E. Fokas, eds. 2008. Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and 
Variations. Aldershot, United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing Company.
Blumenberg, H. 1985. The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Böckenförde, E. W. 1991. The rise of the state as a process of secularization. In State, Society 
and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law, 26–46. New York: Berg.
Engelhardt, H. T., Jr. 1986. The Foundations of Bioethics. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press.
———. 1996. The Foundations of Bioethics. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
———. 2000. The Foundations of Christian Bioethics. Lisse, the Netherlands: Swets & Zetlinger.
———. 2011. Viaggi in Italia. Saggi di Bioetica. Florence, Italy: Le Lettere.
———. Forthcoming. After God: Morality and Bioethics in a Secular Age. Yonkers, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press.
Hauerwas, S. 1986. Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally 
Handicapped and the Church. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Joas, H. 2008. Do We Need Religion? On the Experience of Self-Transcendence. Boulder, CO: 
Paradigm Publishers.
MacIntyre, A. 2007. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press.
Müller, D. 1995. Bioétique. In Encyclopédie du Protestantisme, ed. P. Gisel, 135-154. Paris, 
France: Cerf-Labor et Fides. 
Savarino, L. 2001. Heidegger e il Cristianesimo, 1916–1927. Naples, Italy: Liguori Editore.
———. 2012. Bioetica Cristiana e Società Secolare. Una Lettura Protestante delle Questioni di 
Fine Vita. Turin, Italy: Claudiana.
Strauss, S. 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Taylor, C. 2007. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Vattimo, G. 1991. The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
182
